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ABSTRACT: This paper describes an effort to integrate human behavior models from a range of ability, stress,
emotion, decision theoretic, and motivation literatures into a game-theoretic framework appropriate for representing
synthetic asymmetric agents and scenarios. Our goal is to create a common mathematical framework (CMF) and an
open agent architecture that allows one to research and explore alternative behavior models to add realism to software
agents - e.g., physiology and stress, personal values and emotive states, and cultural influences. Our CMF is based on a
dynamical, game-theoretic approach to evolution and equilibria in Markov chains representing states of the world that
the agents can act upon. In these worlds the agents' utilities (payoffs) are derived by a deep model of cognitive
appraisal of intention achievement including assessment of emotional activation/decay relative to value hierarchies,
and subject to (integrated) stress and related constraints. We present the progress to date on the mathematical
framework, and on an environment for quickly editing opponents in terms of the various elements of the cognitive
appraiser, utility generators, value hierarchies, and Markov chains. We illustrate the approach via an example training
game for counter-terrorism and crowd management. Future research needs are elaborated including validity issues
and ways to overcome the gaps in the behavioral literatures that confront developers of asymmetric forces.

1. Introduction
A common concern amongst agent developers is to
increase the realism of the agents’ behavior and cognition.
In training, wargaming, and operations rehearsal
simulators there is a growing realization that greater
cognitive subtlety and behavioral sensitivity in the agents
leads to both (1) a greater ability to explore alternative
strategies and tactics when playing against them and (2)
higher levels of skill attainment for the human trainees:
e.g., see [1] and [2]. For this to happen, the tactics,
performance, and behavior of agents must change as one
alters an array of behavioral and cognitive variables. As a
few examples, one would like agent behavior to
realistically change as a function of: the culture they come
from (vital for mission rehearsal against forces from
different countries); their level of fatigue and stress over
time and in different situations; and/or the group
effectivity in, say, the loss of an opposing force’s leader.
At present, however, this does not happen, and in most of
the available combat simulators the agents conduct
operations endlessly without tiring, never make mistakes
of judgment, and uniformly (and predictably) carry out

the doctrines of symmetric, sometimes vanquished
opponents, such as the Warsaw Pact, among others.
Closely related to the topic of emulating human behavior
is that of “believability” of agents. The basic premise is
that characters should appear to be alive, to think broadly,
to react emotionally and with personality to appropriate
circumstances. There is a growing graphics and animated
agent literature on the believability topic (e.g., see [3], [4]
and [5]), and much of this work focuses on using great
personality to mask the lack of deeper reasoning ability.
However, in this paper we are less interested in the
kinesthetics, media and broadly appealing personalities,
than we are in the planning, judging, and choosing types
of behavior -- the reacting and deliberating that goes on
“under the hood” of embodied agents. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly the human behavior literature is
fragmented and it is difficult for agent developers to find
and integrate published models of deeper behavior. Our
research involves developing an integrative framework
for emulating human behavior in order to make use of
published behavioral results to construct agent models.
We are not attempting basic research on how humans
think but on how well existing models might work

together in agent settings. That is, the framework
presented here is intended for experiments on how to
integrate and best exploit published behavioral models, so
as to improve the realism of agent behaviors when one
seeks to model individual differences such as stress,
emotion, and culture.
In particular, we are interested in emergent macrobehavior due to micro-decisions of bounded-rational
agents and with developing a framework that promotes
the study of specific phenomena (i.e., emotions, stress,
and cultural values) that lead to limits of rationality. What
motivates agents to select actions that sub-optimize their
own utility as well as that of groups whose causes they
seek to advance? To explore this question, we have been
researching a framework that allows one to investigate the
duality of mind-body interaction in terms of the impact of
environment and physiology on stress and, in turn, of
stressors on rationality. Our framework also attempts to
integrate value systems and emotion-based appraisals of
decision options along with the stress constraints. That is,
we have been working towards a framework that permits
one to examine the impacts of stress, culture, and emotion
upon decisionmaking. With such a framework, one
should, as an example, be able to readily model and
visually render what makes one protesting crowd throw
stones while another peacefully demonstrates.
As soon as one opens the door to modeling the impact of
stress, culture, and emotion on rationality, one must be
amenable to the idea that competing views, results,
models, and approaches have to be examined and
potentially integrated. The point of such a research
program should not be to argue for one approach or
theory over another, but to provide ways to readily study
alternative models of whatever contributes to the
phenomena of interest.
1.1 Role of Emotion and Concern Ontologies in Agent
Behavior
“Emotive computing” is often taken to mean the linking
of the agent state to facial and body expressions, vocal
intonation, and humorous or quirky animation effects:
e.g., see [6], [7] and [4]. However, recent theories identify
emotions as vital to the decision-making process and to
manage competing motivations [8]. According to these
theories, integrating emotion models into our agents will
yield not only more believable decision-makers, but also
more realistic behavior by providing a deep model of
utility. These agents will delicately balance, for example,
threat elimination versus self-preservation, in much the
same way it is believed that people do. These theories
suggest that without adding emotional construal of events,
the agents won’t know what to focus upon and what to
ignore, and won’t know how to balance the set of next -

step alternative actions against larger concerns, as in the
case of Damasio’s pre-frontal cortex damaged patients
who spend the entire day mired in highly logical decision
analyses of banalities, even at the cost of their own selfinterest and survival.
Important implementations of these ideas and theories
were attempted in the “believable agents” movement such
as [4] and [5] which seek to improve the believability of
characters’ behavior in fictional settings with the help of
an emotion model. The OCC model is probably the most
widely implemented of the emotion models (e.g., [9], [10]
and [11]) and it explains the mechanisms by which
events, actions, and objects in the world around us
activate emotional construals. In both Oz [4] and the
Affective Reasoner [5] projects, emotion was largely
modeled as a reactive capability that helped characters to
recognize situations and to reflect broad and believable
personality characteristics. Later versions of Oz include a
behavior planner, but the link between emotion construals
and behavioral choice is never well articulated in their
published accounts. On the other hand, [12] and [13]
concretely extend the OCC model via the use of an event
planner into a deeper, deliberative reasoning mode where
agents were able to construe the value of plans and plan
elements (events that haven’t happened yet). In the
current paper, we extend this still further so that agents
can construe the value not only of plan elements (future
events), but so they also can construe the impact of
objects and behavior standards both on themselves and on
those they like/dislike. We go beyond this too to the area
of what is probably unconscious construals of stressors
such as fatigue, time pressure, and physiological
pressures. This means we attempt a fairly full
implementation of the OCC model for reactions and
deliberations of all types of events, actions, and objects.
This approach provides a generalizable solution to
another issue in the OCC model. The OCC model
indicates what emotions arise when events, actions, or
objects in the world are construed, but not what causes
those emotions or what actions an agent is likely to take
as a result. There is no connection between emotion and
world values, even though other theories suggest such a
link [8], [10] and [11]. In contrast, concern or value
ontologies are readily available in the open literature (e.g.,
the ten commandments or the Koran for a moral code,
military doctrine for action guidance, etc.) and may
readily be utilized to implement an agent of a given type
in the framework we present here. Ideally, one would like
to tie such concern ontologies indirectly to the emotional
processes of the agent, so that situation recognition as
well as utilities for next actions are derived from emotions
about ontologies and so that both reacting and
deliberating (judging, planning, choosing, etc.) are
affected by emotion.

2. Cognitive Architecture and Framework
The research described here is not to propose the best
cognitive architecture or agent algorithms but to propose a
reasonable framework within which the many
contributions from the literature can be integrated,
investigated, and extended as needed. That framework
includes four somewhat arbitrarily separated subsystems
plus a memory that form the stimulus-response capability
of an agent as shown in Figure 2. There are a large
number of similar frameworks in the literature: e.g. a
useful comparison of 60 such models may be found in
Crumley & Sherman [14]. The model we depict here
shows an agent that receives stimuli and formulates
responses that act as stimuli and/or limits for subsequent
systems. The flow of processing in a purely reactive
system would be counter-clockwise starting at the
“stimuli” label, however, we are also interested in a
deliberative system, one that can ponder its responses and
run clockwise from the “cognitive system” to seek stimuli
to support alternative response testing.

beliefs are those processed in the game theoretic sense of
observing the world and of forming and remembering
simple statistical models of the actions of those near us in
the situation of interest. Desires are not well-defined in
the BDI model, so here we define them as the futurefocused affective states of hope and fear as generated by
the emotion system (Section 3.3). Intentions are the
planned actions and sets of orders that the agent is seeking
to carry out (a mn in A).
2.1 Stress and the Physiological Subsystem

Figure 1 – Top Level of the Integrative Architecture for
Researching Alternative Human Behavior Models for
Generic Agents

The physiological subsystem of Figure 1 initially reacts to
a set of stimuli that are perceived from and/or experienced
in the environment. This subsystem includes all sensory
apparatus, but also grouped into here are a number of
physical processes that may be thought of as reservoirs
that can be depleted and replenished up to a capacity. At
present we model eight physiological reservoirs or
stressors, including: energy, sleep, nutrients, noise and
light impacts, and other physical capacities: [15] provides
more detail. For each of these there are a large number of
stressors that moderate an agent’s ability to perform up to
capacity, and that in some cases send out alarms, for
example when pain occurs or when other thresholds are
exceeded (e.g., hunger, fatigue, panic, etc.). An important
criterion for such a module is that it supports study of
common questions about performance moderators: e.g.,
the easy addition or deletion of reservoirs of interest to a
given study or training world (e.g., pain from virtual
injuries, stress from proximity to land mines, etc.),
individual differences in reacting to the same stressors,
and/or how to model reservoir behaviors either linearly
(our present approach) or non-linearly such as with biorhythms. Another vital criterion for such a module is that
it should support studying alternative mechanisms for
combining the many low level stressors and performance
moderator functions into a single stress level. It is the
overall stress that effects each of the other subsystems,
and one would like a framework that shows how to
compute an integrated level and then each of the
subsequent modules need capabilities to reflect how their
functioning is effected – emotions about stress, judgments
under stress, and stressed motor/expressive acts.

The agent model of interest to us is that of a modified
Markov Decision Process (MDP). That is, the agent seeks
to traverse a hierarchical and multi-stage Markov chain
which is the set of nested games such as the one depicted
partially in the case study (Sect. 3). In order for the agent
to be aware of this chain one would need to place it into
the agent’s working memory as G(A,C), a set of possible
goals and tasks that the agent might wish to work its way
through as the game unfolds. More broadly, working
memory should store and process beliefs, desires, and
intentions. In keeping with the BDI agent model, the

In particular, we model integrated stress or iSTRESS as a
result of three prime determinants – (1) event stress (ES)
which tracks agents’ adverse and positive events, (2) time
pressure (TP) which is a normalized ratio of available vs.
required time for the tasks at hand, and (3) effective
fatigue (EF) which integrates a normalized metric based
on current level of many of the physiological reservoirs.
Each of these is quantitatively derived and then
emotionally filtered since a stoic will construe the same
facts differently than a nervous type. The next section
describes the emotional filtering. The quantitative factors
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that go into these modifiers are then summarized via the
following where f{.} is currently a linear additivity
model:

Decision Effectiveness

iSTRESS(t) = f{ES(t), TP(t), EF(t)}
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although occasionally maladaptive if danger is imminent
and a split-second response is required, generally leads to
decisions of the best quality". Some authors have since
refined these ideas as with Klein et al. [17] who shows
that experts work effectively in the “near panic” mode
where they immediately recognize a best or near best
alternative without vigilant scanning of other alternatives.
Unfortunately, Janis & Mann [16] do not provide either
(1) precise threshold values (Ω i ) that indicate when
decision makers trigger a change in coping style, or (2)
any insight into how to integrate the many diverse stimuli,
factors, or PMFs that determine stress and time pressure
or risk. For these purposes, at present we use logic rules
to combine these three factors. For example, such rules
must account for facts such as a Very High value of
anyone of the factors could push the agent to panic.
However, panic is more likely if at least one factor is very
high and another is high. Or alternatively, if one factor is
very high and both of the others are moderately high,
panic might also result.

Very High

Figure 2 - The Classic Performance Moderator Function
is an Inverted-U
It is one thing to quantitatively derive an integrated metric
called iSTRESS, but it is another to interpret its meaning
and to translate that meaning into overall agent coping
style. The approach we’ve adopted for accomplishing this
translation is derived from Janis & Mann [16] who
provide what is probably the most widely sited taxonomy
of decision strategies for coping under stress, time
pressure, and risk. We interpret this taxonomy as the steps
of the inverted U-curve of Figure 2 and define it below.
The taxonomy includes a decisional balance sheet that
indicates how stress, time pressure, and risk drive the
decision maker from one coping strategy to another and
we depict these items across the X-axis of Figure 2.
In particular, we use the framework without further
elaboration here to label the cutoff points for the
integrated stress, or the iSTRESS variable and to
constrain the decision making since a given stress level
dictates the agent’s ability to collect and process both
information and action alternatives (a ∈ A) when in a
given state, s.
All but the third of the coping patterns vigilance regarded
by Janis & Mann [16] as "defective." The first two, while
occasionally adaptive in routine or minor decisions, often
lead to poor decision-making if a vital choice must be
made. Similarly, the last two patterns may occasionally be
adaptive but generally reduce the DM's chances of
averting serious loss. The authors note, vigilance,

The results of physiology and stress are thus a bounding
on the parameters that guide the agent’s decision or
cognitive subsystem and that dictate the coping style it is
able to select. These parameters and decision style
constraints do not in themselves provide any guidance on
how to construe the situation, on the sense-making that
needs to go on. For that we turn to the emotion
subsystem.
2.2 Emoti on Appraisal as a Deep Model of Utility
In particular, the emotion subsystem receives stimuli from
the sensors as adjusted and moderated by the
physiological system. It includes a long term associative
or connectionist memory of its concern ontologies that are
activated by the situational stimuli as well as any
internally recalled stimuli. These stimuli and their impact
on the concern ontologies act as releasers of alternative
emotional construals and intensity levels. These
emotional activations in turn provide the somatic markers
that serve as situation recognition and that help us to
recognize a problem that needs action, potential decisions
to act on, and so on. In order to support research on
alternative emotional construal theories this subsystem
must include an easily alterable set of activation/decay
equations and parameters for a variable number of
emotions. Further, since construals are based on concern
ontologies, this module must serve as a concerns ontology
processor and editor. Simply by authoring alternative
concern ontologies, one should be able to capture the
behaviors of alternative “types” of people and
organizations and how differently they would assess the
same events, actions, and artifacts in the world. This
requires the emotion module to derive the elements of

utility and payoff that the cognitive system will use to
access alternative actions.
In the next section we will examine how to combine
multiple emotions into a utility estimate for a given state.
For now we will only examine how our different
emotions arise when confronted by a new state, s, of the
world, or in reaction to thinking about being in that state.
In general, we propose that any of a number of ξ diverse
emotions could arise with intensity, I, and that this
intensity would be somehow correlated to importance of
one’s values or concern set (C) and whether those
concerns succeed or fail for the state in question. We
express this as

Iξ ( sk ) =

∑ ∑[W

ijl

(c ) * f 1(r j) * f2 (O,N )]

[2.0]

j ∈ Jξ c∈Cijkl

Where,
Iξ(s k ) = Intensity of emotion, ξ, due to the kth state of the
world
Jξ = The set of all agents relevant to ξ . J1 is the set
consisting only of the self, and J2 is the set consisting of
everyone but the self, and J is the union of J1 and J2.
W ij (Cijkl ) = Weighted importance of the values of agent j
that succeed and fail in one’s ith concern set.
Cijkl = A list of paths through the ith ontology of agent j
triggered to condition l (0=success or 1=failure) by state
k.
f1(rjk ) = A function that captures the strength of
positive and negative relationships one has with the j
agents and objects that are effected or spared in state k
f2(O,N) = A function that captures temporal
factors of the state and how to discount and
merge one’s emotions from the past, in the
present, and for the future
This expression captures the major dimensions of concern
in any emotional construal – values, relationships, and
temporal aspects. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
linear additivity of multiple arousals of the same emotion
from the i=1,I different sets of values that the state may
precipitate.
There are several emotion models from the psychology
literature that can help to provide greater degrees of detail
for such a model, particularly a class of models known as
cognitive appraisal theories. These include the models
mentioned earlier [9], [10] and [11] that take as input a set
of things that the agent is concerned about and how they
were effected recently, and determine which emotions
result. Most of them fit into the structure of equation 2.0
but they have different strengths to bring to bear. At
present we have decided to pursue the OCC model [9] to
see how it helps out. In the OCC model, there are 11 pairs

of oppositely valenced emotions (ξ). One pair we use here
as an example is pride-shame. Another pair we mentioned
earlier was hope-fear for future events.
One can
experience both emotions of a given pair at the same time
and if their intensities are equal, they cancel out from a
utility perspective.
The OCC model assumes a decision making agent has 3
types of concern trees about the world: goals for action,
standards that people should follow, and preferences for
objects. Let us suppose as in Figures 3a & b that we have
a terrorist agent who has two concern trees (let |C| = 2):
one for standards (i=1) about how agents should act and
one for preferences about objects or artifacts in the world
(i=2). Of course any such agent would have many more
concern trees and each might be more richly filled in, but
these will suffice for the sake of the example. And in fact,
the stopping rule on filling in concern trees for any agent
is the limit of what behavior is needed from them in the
scenario or micro-world in question. One can see from
Figure 3 that concern trees bottom out in leaf nodes that
can be tested against elements (events, actions, nearby
objects, etc.) of the current state, k. Further, concern trees
hold an agent’s previously learned values or importance
weights. Each link of a concern tree si labeled with a
weight, w, and the sum of child weights always sums to
1.0 for the sake of convenience. The children can be
either strictly or non-exclusively conjunctive or
disjunctive.
Thus far in our research we have derived the structure and
weights on these trees manually as part of the process of
building agents for a given micro-world, though one
could in principle derive these trees via machine learning
and knowledge discovery when interacting with a news
event dataset about a given terrorist group. The way we
use these trees in Equation 2.0 is as an evaluation function
for Wi. That is, when a given state of the world causes a
leaf node to fail or succeed, that leads to the wi being
multiplied together up the branch of the tree from leaf
node to root, and the overall Wi of that concern tree is
computed. We gave details of how this works in Johns &
Silverman [18].
Consider how the use of the trees of Figure 3a&b result in
the weighting on a strategy resulting in being dead. Upon
the agent contemplating his death (k=”dead”), no
preferences are caused to succeed or fail by being dead.
Consequently, no preference-based emotions would be
generated from this agent’s object preference ontology.
However, k=’dead’ does effect the agent’s standards tree
and one standard (i = 1) directly succeeds and one fails.
He feels pride at having attempted his mission
(c=”attempt current mission”) for two reasons: he has
fulfilled his commitment to the organization, and has
attempted something to correct a perceived injustice.

inroads into how to handle these and we address them
rather fully, along with a number of open research
questions, in Silverman [15].
2.3 Game Theory and the Cognitive Subsystem

3a
–
Terrorist’s
Behavior/Action

Standards

for

Agent

3b – Terrorist’s Preferences for Artifacts or Objects
Figure 3 – Concern Ontologies Showing Part of the
Standards and Preferences of a Sample Terrorist
However, his mission involved returning home safely,
which is clearly thwarted by failing to survive.
Consequently, he will feel shame at his incompetence as
well.
On balance, in the current state, pride slightly outweighs
shame at being a martyr. Whether an agent’s decision
subsystem would choose death, however, is also a
function of its iSTRESS or Ω level and of its current goal
tree construals, a topic we omitted from this example due
to space considerations, though we illustrate a goal tree
construal in Sec.3. Also omitted from this discussion are
several other dimensions of the agent’s reasoning in social
situations, a few examples of which are: (1) construing
relationships to others in the scenario that the agent likes,
dislikes, etc.; (2) explicit modeling of partial knowledge
of the emotions of those others to further guide his own
actions; (3) assigning credit/blame to others for various
actions and events; and (4) managing likelihood and
temporal factors. The OCC model provides a number of

The cognitive subsystem serves in our model as the point
where the diverse emotions, stressors, memories, and
other factors are all integrated into a decision for action
(or inaction) to transition to a next state (or return to the
same state) in the Markov decision process sense. In
essence, at each node of the Markov chain (and at each
tick of the simulator’s clock) each agent must be able to
process the following information: the state name (or ID);
the allowable transitions and what action might cause
those state transitions (a nm in A(iSTRESS)); current
intentions as provided in a task list or plan and the
intentions of their prior actions; expectations of what
other agents are going to do in this state based on recent
history and other memories/beliefs G(A, U, C); desires
for actions based on the 11 pairs of emotional scales
(Iξ (s k ) where ξ = 1,22); stress-based coping level (Ω i
where i = 1,5); and a mood, µ, that we discuss below.
Using all this information as stimuli, the agent must select
a decision style, Φ, also defined below, and process the
stimuli to produce a best response (BR) that maximizes
expected, discounted rewards or utilities in the current
iteration of the game. The cognitive subsystem is thus
governed by the following equation:
BEST REPLY (BRt ) = Φµ, iSTRESS, Ω{Umn (s t , amnt ), pmn },
subject to amnt ∈ A(iSTRESS)
[3.3]
Where,
Φµ, iSTRESS, Ω{.} =
as defined below for the
alternative values of µ, iSTRESS, and Ω
p mn
= perceived probability = (1 – ∆) e m + ∆mτ p mτ
u mn
= (1-δ)x(U from equation 3.1)
∆
= memory coefficient (discounting the past)
τ
= number periods to look back
0
action
m
not
situationally relevant
em
= 1.0
action m is situationally relevant
δ
= expectation coefficient (discounting the future)
A(iSTRESS) = action set available after integrated stress
appraisal (see Section 2.1)
We assume utilities for next states are released from the
emotional activations. The previous section used the OCC
model to help generate up to 11 pairs of emotions with
intensities (Iξ) for the current and/or next state of iterative
play. Utility may be thought of as the simple summation
of all positive and negative emotions for an action leading
to a state. Since there will be 11 pairs of oppositely

valenced emotions in the OCC model, we normalize the
sum as follows so that utility varies between –1 and +1:
U = Σ Iξ(s k )/11
[3.1]
ξ
While one can argue against the idea of aggregating
individual emotions, this summation is consistent with the
somatic marker theory. One learns a single impression or
feeling about each state and about actions that might bring
about or avoid those states. The utility term, in turn, is
derived dynamically during each iteration from an
emotional construal of the utility of each action strategy
relative to that agent’s importance-weighted concern
ontology minus the cost of carrying out that strategy. We
further introduce a modifier on the emotional construal
function – the first is a discount factor, δ, that more
heavily weights game achievement the closer the agent is
to the end of that stage of the game. Thus an agent might
be conservative and construe survival as more important
early in the game, yet be willing to make more daring
maneuvers near the end point:e.g., see Anderson, 2001.
It is useful to now turn to the discussion of the decision
processing style function, Φ µ, iSTRESS, Ω . There is a large
literature on decision style functions (e.g., among many
others see [19], [20], [15], [16] and [17]), and the
discussion here is merely to indicate that there is a rich set
of possibilities that one can explore within the framework
proposed here.
For example, under perfect conditions, humans are
presumed to be rational and behave according to Bayes
Theorem and expected utility, yet as conditions degrade,
they initially follow the dictums of subjective expected
utility theory [19] and, eventually, of Recognition Primed
Decisionmaking [17] or panic. Cognitive Continuum
Theory [20] and Conflict Theory [16] provide compelling
explanations of when each decision model is likely to
prevail, and we adopt and adapt the latter for now.

allow them to portray alternative behaviors (e.g., fatigue
leads to slower rate of movement across the screen). Also,
the motor system serves as a stimuli to the other systems.
For example crouching for a long period might cause
fatigue, pain, emotive distress, and so on.

3. Case Study: Emergent Crowd Behaviors
We have attempted an initial, prototype implementation
of our cognitive agent architecture to demonstrate how
one might apply it to model the impact of alternative
personas and motivations upon crowd behavior. This is
not the final word on how to model crowd motivations
and behavior, rather this is an attempt to illustrate the
range and flexibility that the architecture supports.
The population of the city is initially meandering among
random places along set paths. Upon becoming aware of
the protest via a message broadcast to all agents, each
individual decides whether or not to attend the protest,
and if so in what capacity – either to observe or to
participate. Figure 4 shows a small group at the outset of
the protest, marching around in picket line formation in
front of a security guard. While the choice of action here
is often the same among various agents, the motivations
for doing so can vary significantly. In fact, one agent is
attending on a mission for the guerilla group, with the
express purpose of causing a public disruption. This
simple scenario requires one to model terrorists,
defenders, civilians, crowd dynamics, population opinion
evolution, and so on.

2.4 Motor/Expressivity Subsystem
We complete the discussion of earlier Figure 1 by turning
now to the motor/expressive subsystem. This module
contains libraries of stored procedures that allow the agent
to interact with the microworld and that allow it to display
its motor and expressive outputs. Based on stimuli from
all the other subsystems, the motor subsystem recalls,
activates, and adjusts the relevant stored procedures so it
can perform the actions intended to reach the (best reply)
next state. In attempting to carry out the actions the motor
system seeks to carry out best reply actions and perform
up to the limits that the physiologic system imposes and
by expressing the emotions that currently dominate. To
support this effort, those procedures include functions that

Figure 4 – Screen Shot of the Protest Scene Showing
Observers on the Road, Picketers Holding Placards, and a
Sole Security Agent Facing the Crowd.

To support viewing the internals of all these agents, on
the left side of Figure 4 is a set of agent
identifiers/pulldowns and window tabs. One of the
pulldowns allows the user to select a terrorist, defender,
or civilian (including up to five types of civilians such as
unemployed male, employed male, female, etc) to inspect.
For the selected agent, there are several tabbed windows
also on the left side of Figure 1 – general, accessors,
physiology, stress, emotion, and strategy – that allow one
to inspect what that agent experiences, feels, and thinks
about the microworld. From these various tabs one can
thus piece together the agent’s beliefs, desires, and
intentions of the moment.
Let us examine a portion of the scenario in more detail so
one can better see how the diverse agents determine their
motives, and carry out their actions. The instigator agent
sent by the guerilla group to the protest has a portion of
his Markov chain that deals with encountering security,
taunting them, and precipitating violent reactions from
them. Using sources such as [18], [21] and [22] we have
derived a representative concern ontology as shown in
Figure 5 that includes strong weightings on his goals for
belonging (to his terrorist cell), esteem from taking action
(they tend to be young males who are action-prone), and
self-actualization due to reaching for ideals of freedom.
Each of these is grounded in lower level goals that are
positively aroused by taking action against the security
forces.
Social psychologists have studied factors that contribute
to aggressive crowd behavior: e.g., see McPhail [23] and
Horowitz [24] among others. There is not uniform
agreement on the particulars, but in general the common
factors that tend to contribute include: presence of
weapons, authoritarian government, lining up behind a
barricade, drawing lines between “us” and “you”,
dramatizing issues (e.g., in a speech) and making victims,
large spatially concentrated crowds, and presence of
television camera and crew. Also, rioters do not tend to be
criminals, but they do tend to be the unemployed, single,
young males without children. The bulk of attendees
drawn to participate in the example protest are those very
folks. They are therefore susceptible to crowd effects, and
to a tipping event that sets them on a rampage including
rioting and looting.
The tipping event occurs when the instigator is struck by
the checkpoint guard (a neophyte in proper crowd
dispersal tactics), an event that is observed by those near
the front and communicated loudly. Coupled with the
increasingly real possibility of becoming the target of
violence themselves, the majority of agents strongly
concerned with personal and family safety (employed
males, females, etc) are prone to simply disperse. There

are insufficient security forces present for the relative size
and density of this crowd, a fact of which the young males
are aware.
The erupting chaos provides a perfect
diversion for, the young unemployed males to target
nearby stores and loot them for material items.

Figure 5 – Overview of the Goal Portion of the Concern
Ontology of an Agent Provocateur

4. Conclusions and Next Steps
To summarize, diverse communities are interested today
in building realistic human-like behaviors into virtual
personas. The animation and graphics approaches have
lead to kinesthetically appealing and reactive agents. A
few such investigators are now seeking to make them
more behaviorally and cognitively realistic by reaching
out to the artificial life, evolutionary computing and
rational agent approaches. These approaches offer many
benefits, but they need to be grounded in the behavioral
literature if they are to be faithful to how humans actually
behave and think. The behavioral literature, however,
while vast, is ill-p repared for and cannot be directly
encoded into models useful in agent architectures. This
sets the stage for the goals and objectives of the current
research.
A major challenge of this research, is the validity of the
concern system ontologies and behavioral models we
derive from the literature and try to integrate within our
framework. As engineers, we are concerned with validity
from several perspectives including the (1) data-

groundedness of the models and ontologies we extract
from the literature, and (2) correspondence of behavioral
emergence and collectives with actual dynamics observed
in the real world. In terms of data-groundedness, we
conducted an extended review of the behavioral literature
[15] and found a great many physiological studies that
seem to be legitimately grounded and that possess model
parameter significance from a statistical sense. However,
these tend to be restricted to the performance moderator
functions that feed into the individual reservoirs or
components of the physiological subsystem. As soon as
one tries to integrate across moderators and synthesize the
iSTRESS (or even effective fatigue), one rapidly departs
from grounded theories and enters into the realm of
informed opinion. The problem only grows worse for the
emotion subsystem, and for the cognitive layer if one
hopes to incorporate behavioral decision theory, crowd
models, and the like. And the informed opinions one
encounters in the behavioral literature are not consistent.
One must choose one’s HBMs and opinion leaders.
We have tried to provide one such collection of HBMs in
this paper. This is not the penultimate integrative HBM,
rather it is at present a humble structure. We have striven
initially for satisfying a workability test. That is, we set
out to attempt to learn what we could gain by having
viable models integrated across all 4 subsystems and
across factors within each subsystem. In that regard, our
efforts to date are successful. We now have an integrated
fabric stitching together the models of varying
groundedness and of different opinion leaders. We can
rather easily plug in a new opinion leader’s model and
play it within our framework to study its impact, its
properties, and its strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, we offer no defense at present for our failure to
have conducted correspondence tests. Its true that the
agents may be observed to progress through various Ω
levels (unconflicted adherence during daily routine,
vigilant upon arriving at the protest, and panic during the
looting) and the OCC model makes use of the reservoirs,
crowd proximity, and an array of goals, preferences, and
standards to generate emotions that appear consistent with
what crowds probably feel. However, we simply haven’t
matured this research to the point yet where we are able to
recreate specific historical crowd events from the real
world, and to see how well our models are able to
simulate actual emergent behavior. That is, however, a
vital next step for benchmarking and tuning our models.
Despite validity concerns, there have been some lessons
learned to date:
• The literature is helpful for improving the realism of
behavior models – We have completed an in-depth survey
of the literature and have found a number of models that

can be used as the basis of cognitive models for agent
behavior. In fact the problem is less that there aren’t any
models, so much as the fact that there are too many and
none of them are integrated. The bulk of the effort we
undertook to date is to document those models, and to
figure out how to integrate them into a common
mathematical framework.
• There are benefits (and costs) of modeling stressemotion-decision processing as an integrated topic – In
attempting to create an integrated model, the benefits of
this approach are that it is more realistic to try and deal
with the interplay. Certainly these dimensions are
connected in people, and the ability to address all of them
in simulations opens up a large number of possibilities for
improving agent behavior and for confronting trainees
with more realistic scenes.
• Concern ontologies are vital but require ontological
engineering– The approach we presented in this paper
relies on a common mathematical framework (expected
utility) to integrate many disparate models and theories so
that agents can assess preferences and standards and
determine next actions they find desirable subject to stress
induced limitations and bias tendencies. However, to do
this properly for any given simulation will also require
extensive ontological engineering to flesh out the lower
levels of the concern ontologies. Our current efforts are
aimed at adding a set of tools for authoring, maintaining,
and visualizing these ontologies.
• Emotion models are useful for utility and decision
making not just for expressivity – A related contribution
of this paper lies in the use of ontology-derived emotion
to help derive utilities dynamically. In standard decision
theoretic models there is no basis for agents to compute
their own utility functions. Instead these are derived by
subject matter experts and inserted directly into the
agent’s decision module. In the approach postulated here,
the subject matter experts would interact at a stage earlier,
at the stage of helping to define the concern ontologies so
that the agents can derive their own utility functions,
values, and tradeoffs. This approach frees experts from
having to infer utilities, and it places the debate more
squarely on open literature accounts of value sets and
concern ontologies.
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